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European Financial System Governance 
Karel Lannoo* 
 
Much has been achieved in upgrading and 
integrating the ‘governance’ of the European 
financial system in recent years. In parallel with the 
successful adoption of the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP), the EU managed to reform its 
regulatory structure, extending what was proposed 
by the Lamfalussy Committee for securities 
markets in early 2001 to banking and insurance. 
The EU thus created permanent committees of 
securities, banking and insurance supervisors (the 
‘Level 3 Committees’ – CESR, CEBS and 
CEIOPS). This rapid reform demonstrated that 
national authorities were capable of overcoming 
domestic biases, adapting the supervisory 
structure, and instituting a much greater degree of 
supervisory cooperation than had existed 
previously. 
What remains to be done? As the European 
Commission has remarked on repeated occasions 
over the last few months, and as was endorsed by 
the EU Council, the priority should essentially be 
implementation and enforcement, and 
consolidation of the new supervisory structure. 
‘Regulatory fatigue’ is widespread amongst 
supervisors and industry, which means that there 
is no place for another large-scale FSAP. 
Nevertheless, expectations have been raised 
within markets that the financial sector will 
become more integrated and will function more 
efficiently, meaning that the demand may rapidly 
arise for further adaptations and adjustments. 
There could be spill-overs to areas where the new 
regulatory or supervisory structure is not 
applicable. Or the intensified form of cooperation 
could make the lacunas in the current framework 
even more apparent.  
 
* Karel Lannoo is Chief Executive at CEPS and head 
of the research unit on Finance and Banking. This paper 
was initially prepared for the conference on European 
Economic Governance, organised by ISPI in Torino on 6 
December 2005. It was also presented at the conference 
on The legal Foundations of International Monetary 
Stability, London School of Economics, 27-28 April 2006. 
The intention of this paper is not to make another 
assessment of the FSAP and its impact,
1 but rather to 
address two subjects. First, we discuss whether 
decentralisation is here to stay. This structure has its 
advantages, but creates some unsound asymmetries. 
Second, there are concepts which, in the aftermath of the 
FSAP, are beginning to be widely used, but need 
clarification. Before discussing these issues, we briefly 
review some facts and patterns of evolution in the 
European financial system. 
The European financial system in 
transformation 
Over the past decade, the European financial system has 
been undergoing a significant transformation, evolving 
from what used to be a predominantly bank-based system 
to one with greater reliance on capital markets as a source 
of funding and risk mitigation.
2 While the importance of 
bank financing has continued to increase, signs of the 
move towards a more market-based system have arisen 
largely out of a market segment that is less known to 
policy-makers and the public at large, the bond markets. 
EMU seems to have been the motor behind this 
development, in that one can discern a distinct break in 
the year 1999 from previous patterns. Whereas in 1992, 
the EU bond markets were about half the size of their US 
counterparts in terms of the value of debt outstanding 
relative to GDP, they have by now almost converged, 
growing from 84% of GDP in 1992 to 145% in 2004, 
whereas US markets grew from 150 to 175%. In the 
meantime, the value of bank assets relative to GDP rose 
from 169% of GDP to 237% (2003) in the EU, whereas 
the US figures rose from 59% of GDP to 73%. By 
contrast, equity financing is more than twice as important 
in the US as it is in Europe (in relative terms), accounting 
for 116% of GDP in the US, compared with 62% in Japan 
and 54% in the eurozone countries. 
                                                        
1 For such analysis, see the recent CEPS Task Force Report 
on EU Financial Regulation and Supervision Beyond 2005 
(Lannoo & Casey, 2005). 
2 This part is largely based on the recent CEPS paperback by 
Casey & Lannoo (2005). 
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Figure 1. Bond, equity and bank assets markets in EU-12, EU-15, US and Japan, end 2003 (% of GDP) 
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In value terms, the analysis is similar to the situation 
relative to GDP, since EU and US GDP are more or less 
equivalent. Total assets of European banks have grown 
significantly over the past decade, nearly doubling from 
about €11.8 trillion in 1995 to €22 trillion by January 
2004. Because in 1995 the value of bank assets in the EU 
was roughly double that of debt securities (whose 
combined total then was €5.1 trillion), bond markets had 
a lot of ground to make up. Slowly, they are gaining 
importance relative to bank lending, since, at €13.2 
trillion (end-2003), the value of debt securities issued by 
EU firms and governments represented 62% of the total 
value of bank assets, whereas the same figure stood at 
below 50% in 1995. Coincidentally, they are also gaining 
in relation to the American bond market. In 1999, the 
total value of debt finance (capital market, not bank 
loans) in Europe amounted to €8 trillion; the 
corresponding figure for the US was €12.7 trillion. By 
end-2004, however, debt finance in Europe reached a 
value of €13.5 trillion, compared with €16.7 trillion for 
the US. 
 
Figure 2. Bond, equity and bank assets markets in EU-15, 1995-2003 (billions of ecus/euros) 
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Of the three main sources of external finance – bank 
lending, bonds and publicly-traded equities – the last is 
the least important in the EU, with the total market 
capitalisation of EU exchanges in 2003 (€6 trillion) being 
slightly above a quarter of the value of bank assets. There 
was a point in 1999 when equity markets reached the 
same importance as bond markets, but that trend could 
not be sustained in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
high-tech bubble, which vanquished the new markets and 
triggered very significant, albeit gradual, declines on the 
major European exchanges. 
Generally, debt securities issued in Europe today are 
characterised by longer maturities, significantly larger 
borrowing programmes and greater liquidity than they 
were a decade ago. Impressive rates of growth are also 
mirrored in the market for bond derivatives and 
structured products. The increased activity in the primary 
market was not lost on the secondary market, which also 
witnessed tremendous gains in trading volumes, greatly 
improving liquidity. One of the objectives of EMU, 
namely, the creation of a deeper and more liquid financial 
system, seems thus to have materialised.    
It is interesting to note that the growth in the bond 
markets has come from a segment that hardly existed a 
decade ago, the corporate bond markets. The total value 
of corporate debt outstanding almost quadrupled in the 
eurozone over the period 1999-2004, whereas the same 
variable grew by a mere 43% at the global level, or 35% 
in the US and 1% in Japan.  Between 1999 and 2004, 
corporate debt securities grew from 6% of EU GDP to 
over 15%.  Table 3. Total growth in amount outstanding of debt securities, 1999-2004 
  Eurozone EU-15 US* Japan Rest  of  world World 
Total debt securities  69%  68%  32%  55%  59%  49% 
Government debt securities  50%  44%  7%  109%  66%  49% 
Debt securities issued by financial institutions  77%  101%  60%  -21%  95%  65% 
Corporate debt securities  283%  216%  35%  1%  56%  43% 
* US figures were calculated in dollars, and not in euro, since exchange rate movements would significantly affect the ratios for the US and 
not reflect true market development. 
Source: BIS. 
 
Evidently, the introduction of the euro had a significant 
impact on the currency denomination of many 
international debt issues, as the greater liquidity of the 
currency and its widespread acceptance as a vehicle 
(reserve) currency along the lines of the US dollar has led 
to a great increase in the choice of the euro as a currency 
of issuance. Whereas only 25% of international debt in 
1993 was denominated in currencies that today make up 
the euro, today the corresponding figure is around 40%. 
On the other hand, currencies that once had a role in 
international finance, such as the Japanese yen, the Swiss 
franc and the Canadian dollar, have all but disappeared 
from the international debt market.  
Is decentralised supervision here to stay? 
The evolution in the European financial system traced 
above indicates that 1) the dependence on bank financing 
in the EU has continued to increase and continues to 
differ enormously from the US experience, 
notwithstanding signs of the emergence of the more 
market-based financing, and 2) the adaptations as 
contained in the Financial Services Action Plan, focusing 
on stricter disclosure and tighter conduct of business rules 
for market operators were probably needed, albeit to keep 
pace with market developments. At the same time, 
policy-makers have stepped up coordination to ensure 
that their responses are much more coordinated than they 
used to be, both on the regulatory as well as on the 
supervisory front. 
The centrepiece of EU prudential supervision is home-
country control and mutual recognition. Although the EU 
has increased the level of harmonisation in recent pieces 
of legislation to ease the functioning of mutual 
recognition, member states can continue to impose 
additional rules for firms under their supervision. It is 
only in some pieces of product harmonisation, e.g. the 
prospectus directive (2003/71/EC) and the draft consumer 
credit directive (COM(2005)483 of 7 October 2005), that 
full harmonisation applies. Any form of more centralised 
supervision would thus imply a radical reform of the 
current regulatory framework, as well for insurance, 
banking as for securities markets, and thus also a much 
more advanced form of harmonisation. Under the current 
circumstances, this is not in the cards. 
Alternatives have been proposed to the home-country 
control principle. Some have proposed a system of 
federally-chartered as opposed to domestically-licensed 
financial institutions, as is in place in the United States. 
However, the likelihood of finding agreement amongst 
governments to give this responsibility to the European 
Central Bank is extremely limited, owing to 
accountability problems and the need for a link with 
fiscal powers. In discussing these matters, the Ecofin 
Council (EU Finance Ministers) of 7 May 2002 stated 
that the structure for financial regulation and supervision 
must be consistent with:  
•  “the allocation of powers and responsibilities as set 
out in the Treaty;  
•  appropriate accountability to EU institutions, in 
particular political accountability to the Ecofin 
Council;  
•  subsidiarity, since supervisory tasks are best 
performed as close as possible to supervised entities 
and since financial crises may have implications for 
public finances.” 
Another proposal which was brought up recently is the 
‘26
th regulatory regime’. This proposal was made to 
overcome fragmentation in retail financial markets, but it 
also has supervisory connotations. Because of the need to 
comply with many different host-country consumer 
protection rules, an optional 26
th regime would give 
consumers the possibility to sign up for fully-portable 
financial products. This would foster market integration 
and stimulate the emergence of pan-European operators, 
according to proponents of this scheme (Eurofi, 2005). 
The drawback is that it will be perceived as having no 
‘parentage’. What will happen in case of disputes 
between providers and users of financial services under 
the 26
th regime? Will supervisory authorities accept these 
products alongside those that are following national 
rules? Experience shows that member states tend to see 
optional instruments like Trojan horses. They prefer the 
difficult path of approximation of laws, namely through 
the comitology process, where they can influence the 
outcome (Sainz de Vicuna, 2005). 
The enhanced form of cooperation, which has been put in 
place in recent years, has to a large degree come to 
respond to the needs related to increased market 
integration. We would prefer to focus on consolidation of 
the new structure and enforcement, before new grand 
designs are put forward. The current structure stimulates 4 | Karel Lannoo 
 
inter-agency competition, creates the appropriate 
incentives for supervisors, and allows for exchange of 
best practice. It is better adapted to different degrees of 
development/orientation in financial markets, which 
remain considerable in the EU-25, and is closer to 
business. It also limits moral hazard more than would a 
single supervisory authority (Lannoo, 2002). 
Nevertheless, some adaptations could be made to reduce 
asymmetries, as discussed below.  
1)  Strengthen the multilateral dimension of supervision 
through the creation of a ‘clearinghouse’ for 
supervisory information 
In day-to-day financial supervision, the EU represents a 
complex web of home-host relations. In this multitude of 
bilateral relations, something more multilateral may be 
missing, however. A kind of central ‘clearinghouse’ for 
supervisory information could overcome the asymmetry 
of exchange of information between home and host 
countries. In addition, it could strengthen macro-
prudential control in detecting possible sources of 
financial instability. 
With the host-country authorities being in charge of 
financial stability and the organisation of the deposit 
protection system, and being accountable to local 
taxpayers, a way needs to be found to strengthen mutual 
trust between supervisory authorities. At the moment, a 
home-country supervisory authority may give different 
information about the health of a financial institution 
under its supervision to countries A, B and Z. The latter 
countries would in principle have no possibility to check 
what information was provided to the other host-country 
authorities.  
Host-country authorities, especially those where 
systemically important subsidiaries operate, may be 
concerned that home-country authorities may not care too 
much about such subsidiaries and that they will get the 
bad news when it is already too late, making it necessary 
to bail out the subsidiary at a huge cost to the local 
financial system. In addition, host-country authorities 
may have limited control over the shifting of bad assets 
by bank managers to a host country.  
The powers of the home country were strengthened in the 
recently adopted capital requirements directive (CRD), 
which implements Basel II in European law. Art. 129 of 
the CRD empowers the consolidating supervisor, usually 
based in the home country of the bank, to take the final 
decisions with respect to the validation and final shape of 
the internal ratings-based model. This has to be a joint 
effort, involving both home and host supervisors, but 
with a deadline. The home/consolidating supervisor 
decides ultimately, if no consensus has been reached after 
six months. 
The ongoing work of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), in particular the decision to 
create Common Prudential Reporting (COREP) and 
Common Financial Reporting (FINREP) standards, 
should considerably ease the creation of such a 
multilateral supervisory facility. COREP provides a 
comprehensive harmonised framework for supervisory 
reporting and covers credit risk, market risk and 
operational risk as defined in the revised CRD. It is 
applicable to all EU credit institutions and investment 
firms. Groups operating on a cross-border basis will be 
able to use the same reporting framework, including non-
European banking groups operating in different member 
states. It will facilitate information exchanges between 
supervisory authorities in charge of the different entities 
of a same group. FINREP harmonises balance sheet and 
profit-and-loss account reporting.  
In the area of securities markets, the lack of a central 
depository for supervisory information may give rise to 
similar problems, although the purpose for which this 
information is used may be different. At present, there is 
no central depository where supervisors can check 
information about issuers on capital markets. This 
information is mostly held in the domestic market of the 
issuer, but it is not necessarily stored in a comparable 
form. Under the provisions of Arts. 21 and 22 of the 
transparency directive (2004/109/EC), it will be 
necessary for the home competent authority of the issuers 
to ensure that information filed with the competent 
authority under the prospectus directive is to be made 
easily accessible, which can be achieved through the 
central storage mechanism. The same could be argued 
regarding transaction reporting by brokers to supervisors 
under the markets in financial instruments directive 
(MiFID) (2004/39/EC). 
In the conclusions of its discussions on the financial 
supervision policy (Ecofin, 8 May 2006), the EU Council 
recognised the importance of common formats for 
reporting and data-sharing arrangements, but left 
practical modalities unresolved (i.e. whether they should 
be common databases or interlinked national databases). 
It invited the Level 3 Committees to report to the Ecofin 
by the end of 2007, respectively 2008.  
2)  A bigger role for the Level 3 Committees 
In their current form, the Level 3 Committees have a 
purely advisory role with regard to EU regulation. They 
make proposals for implementing measures to the EU 
Commission and contribute to the good implementation 
of Community law at the member state level.  For matters 
not harmonised by EU law, they can propose standards. 
In certain situations, however, these committees may 
need more formal powers to give their decisions legal 
force.  
A debate on the subject was set in motion by the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
which, in its ‘Himalaya paper’ (CESR, 2004), called for 
possible modifications to give the Level 3 Committees 
some legal powers. They proposed in particular to have 
certain decisions carrying legal force and to allow for European Financial System Governance | 5 
 
delegated supervision within the EU. The former may be 
needed in case of, for example, disagreements between 
different supervisory authorities on how to handle a 
certain issue, to strengthen the mediating role of the 
Level 3 Committee. In the latter case, it could allow 
CESR to decide that the supervision of an exchange, or 
aspects of its business, should be delegated from certain 
host countries to its supposed home country. 
Such changes would have far-reaching legal implications. 
It would give some (albeit very limited) discretionary 
powers to the Level 3 Committees, and bring them a step 
closer to becoming more like, for example, a European 
SEC, albeit of a more virtual nature. Under what form 
this should be done and how accountability would be 
organised, however, are different issues. It should be 
recalled that some directives already foresee in the 
possibility of delegated supervision. The prospectus 
directive (2003/71/EC) foresees the possibility of 
delegated supervision of securities prospectuses, without 
much further discussion on the legal implications, such as 
who has the final responsibility. And the capital 
requirements directive, implementing Basel II in 
European law (adopted in October 2005), allows the 
home-country supervisor (in charge of exercising 
consolidated supervision in the EU) to decide on 
validation of the internal risk model to be used by a bank 
all over the EU. 
This demand for some formal legal powers is seen to be 
premature, and not met by the other Committees. CEBS, 
for example, is not calling for the transfer of legal 
responsibilities to a lead supervisor. Rather, it seeks to 
enhance the role of consolidated supervisor via more 
effective cooperation between all the authorities involved 
in the supervision of a group, while ensuring the 
appropriate involvement of the host supervisors and 
respecting their legal responsibilities.
3 
The Financial Services Committee, in two recent reports, 
stated that these matters should be addressed for the time 
being within the current legal limits. The Level 3 
Committees should create a ‘level 3-mediation process’ 
to settle disputes amongst supervisors, but it would be 
“non-binding and should respect the boundaries set by the 
EU Treaty” (FSC, 2005, p. 20). The delegation of tasks 
should be supported and is already foreseen in certain 
directives, but the delegating supervisor retains full 
political responsibility for all the decisions made. The 
FSC however calls for further study of the legal and 
financial implications of the delegation of tasks. The May 
2006 Ecofin Council endorsed the FSC recommendations 
for further exploration of “the preconditions to the 
establishment of such a mediation mechanism” and “for 
the use of a delegation mechanism” (p. 14). 
                                                        
3 As discussed by a CEBS representative at a CEPS Task 
Force on Basel implementation, 23 March 2005. See also 
the CEBS (2005, p. 3) consultation paper. 
What supervisory convergence? 
The great buzzword of all Level 3 Committees, and also 
of the European Commission White Paper on the post-
FSAP, is supervisory convergence. But it remains unclear 
what exactly is meant by supervisory convergence. Most 
importantly, the question of whether the efficient 
functioning of the single market for financial services 
requires convergence in instruments and procedures, as 
opposed to objectives, must be resolved. Hence, before 
starting a regular reporting on supervisory convergence, 
as the FSC (2006, p. 8) suggested in its latest report, it 
would be advisable to have the concept clarified. 
Naturally, the convergence of supervisory powers is a 
pre-condition for supervisory cooperation to work and for 
any delegation of responsibilities to emerge. 
Nevertheless, the convergence of powers alone will not 
assure that supervisory practices on the ground will be 
convergent. In order for the disparate supervisory 
structures to engage in fruitful policy coordination, a 
preliminary question needs to be resolved: Is 
convergence meant to be convergence in supervisory 
objectives, or in supervisory procedures, or in both? It is 
important to clarify this concept, since the absence of a 
proper specification of convergence will make it 
impossible to enforce the new rules consistently and will 
handicap level 3 almost to the point of arbitrariness. In 
the context of the implementation of Basel II, for 
example, it would be important to have this concept 
clarified before embarking on a further reduction of the 
areas of national discretion.  
Full convergence would not only mean that supervisors 
adopt the same objectives, but also that they adopt the 
same procedures, as well as the same sequencing in those 
procedures. The FSC vaguely defined supervisory 
convergence as “more consistent and common decision-
making and enforcement powers among supervisors” 
(FSC, 2005, p. 16).  But the CESR ‘Himalaya report’ 
seems to be pushing beyond convergence in supervisory 
powers by scouting the territory of procedural 
convergence (e.g. promoting equivalence in ‘supervisory 
intensity’; how supervisory resources are ‘deployed’). 
This process implies ‘institutional maximum 
harmonisation’ rather than granting a certificate of 
equivalence to a foreign supervisor. The step from here to 
a single supervisory authority is not far.  
The difficult constitutional and legal questions that 
remain to be resolved if procedural convergence were to 
be sought instead of equivalence in  supervisory 
outcomes, mean that it might make more sense to push 
for a supervisory structure that is integrated on the level 
of objectives, and not necessarily in instruments or 
procedures (to the extent that the latter are not 
prerequisites for fulfilling the former). Of course, such an 
approach could only be possible in the presence of great 
mutual trust and sufficient political will. And behind all 
this is the broader assumption that some degree of 6 | Karel Lannoo 
 
regulatory competition is healthy, and needs to be 
maintained. 
We would therefore propose that the EU comes forward 
with a proposal to align the objectives of supervision. 
Although the broad objectives are the same – to 
safeguard the stability of the financial system and to 
protect consumers/investors – important differences may 
exist in other objectives. The UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) has as one of its objectives “the 
promotion of public understanding of the financial 
system”, which means that it needs to help consumers to 
understand what financial products they buy. To our 
knowledge, this is not necessarily an objective of other 
supervisory authorities in the EU. Acceptance of this 
objective would come to meet a growing need of 
financial literacy in a world with an increasing 
complexity of financial products, and at the same time 
clarify that the consumer is in the first instance liable for 
her/his financial decisions. 
Such an exercise would also demonstrate that supervisory 
procedures do not need to be fully harmonised. The 
degrees of development of EU financial markets still 
differ importantly, a diversity that has increased with 
enlargement. Full harmonisation of supervisory 
procedures would be a further step in the direction of the 
‘one size fits all’ approach, which would penalise small 
operators and less developed member states. 
Concluding remarks 
Is the current supervisory structure the end of a phase or 
the start of something new? One would have the 
impression that we are exploring the limits of what is 
possible within the context of the current legal structure 
of home-country control and mutual recognition. With 
the Level 3 Committees and the comitology committees, 
we have probably reached the outer-most limit. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that the current Lamfalussy 
committees are ‘embryonic’, integrated sectoral 
supervisory authorities, and that these committees will 
gradually acquire greater powers. The discussion about a 
mediation mechanism and the facilities of delegated 
supervision already point in this direction.  
Within the current structure, some unhealthy asymmetries 
exist, which cannot be easily overcome. A home-country 
authority, even when acting as a consolidated supervisor, 
is finally only accountable to its own electorate. The 
home central bank will only be a lender of last resort for 
the institutions located within its jurisdiction. A central 
clearinghouse of supervisory information would be a 
useful device to provisionally overcome these 
asymmetries. 
A subsequent phase of truly European financial sector 
consolidation, which is in the making, will undoubtedly 
require further legal modifications to allow for more 
integrated supervision. Some have argued for a European 
System of Financial Supervisors analogous to the 
European System of Central Banks (Oosterloo & 
Schoenmaker, 2004). It would give the full responsibility 
for the supervision of cross-border financial institutions 
in the EU to the lead supervisor or to a central body, 
which it would exercise in cooperation with the national 
supervisory authorities. Integrated financial supervision 
could thereby be limited to those issues that are of a real 
systemic nature. Matters related to conduct-of-business 
rules should be left to the member states, under full 
mutual recognition or delegation. 
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Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South-East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 